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A. The Virginia Postmarital Agreement Statute
The Virginia Premarital Agreement Act1 applies to any premari-
tal agreement executed on or after July 1, 1986. The Act basically
allows the parties prior to marriage to contract regarding: (1) the
right to manage and control property, whenever and wherever ac-
quired or located; (2) the disposition of property upon separation,
marital dissolution, divorce, death, or the occurrence or nonoccur-
rence of any other event; (3) spousal support; (4) the making of a
will, trust, or other agreement; (5) life insurance ownership rights;
(6) the choice of law governing the agreement; and (7) "any other
matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in vio-
lation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."2
The 1987 General Assembly, by enacting section 20-155 of the
Code of Virginia (the "Code"),' intended that postnuptial agree-
ments as well as premarital agreements would come under the am-
bit of the Virginia Premarital Agreement Act. Prior to this statute,
Virginia case law recognized that with either antenuptial or post-
nuptial agreements, "the general rule is that agreements between
husband and wife relating to the adjustment of property rights,
even though in contemplation of divorce, are not violative of estab-
* Child custody and support, juvenile delinquency, and abused and neglected children
will be addressed in Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 789 (1987).
** Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A. 1966,
Amherst College; M.A., 1967, Stanford University; J.D., 1973, University of California, Has-
tings College of Law.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
2. Id. For an analysis of the Virginia Premarital Act, see Swisher & Bucur, Domestic
Relations: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 731, 731-36 (1985).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Cum. Supp. 1987) provides:
Marital agreements-Married persons may enter into agreements with each other
for the purpose of settling the rights and obligations of either or both of them, to the
same extent, with the same effect, and subject to the same conditions, as provided in
§§ 20-147 through 20-154 for agreements between prospective spouses, except that
such marital agreements shall become effective immediately upon their execution.
745
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lished public policy unless collusive or made to facilitate a separa-
tion or to aid in procuring a divorce."' 4 Nevertheless, section 20-155
and the Virginia Premarital Agreement Act now clarify prior judi-
cial uncertainty in defining what would constitute valid divorce
planning in antenuptial and postnuptial agreements 5 as opposed to
invalid divorce promotion or facilitation.6
Like the Virginia Premarital Agreement Act, the postnuptial
agreement statute provides that all agreements must be in writing
and signed by both parties.7 The agreement must be entered into
voluntarily, and each party must make a fair and reasonable finan-
cial and property disclosure or a written waiver of the right to that
disclosure.8 Any issue of unconscionability in the postnuptial
agreement would be decided by a court as a matter of law.'
B. Spousal Support
1. Spousal Support and Separation Agreements
There were two important amendments made to both section 20-
10910 and section 20-109.111 of the Virginia Code regarding spousal
support on divorce and the effect of any written agreements filed
by the parties. Section 20-109 was amended to provide that "if a
stipulation or contract signed by the party to whom such relief
might otherwise be awarded is filed before entry of a final decree,
no decree or order . . . shall be entered except in accordance with
that stipulation or contract. ' 12 The old statute required that the
4. Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, 380, 219 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1975) (postnuptial agreement).
The Capps court cited with approval Wife B.T.L. v. Husband H.A.L., 287 A.2d 413, 415
(Del. Ch. 1972); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 213 Tenn. 117, 372 S.W.2d 300 (1963); and Hill v. Hill, 23
Cal. 2d 82, 88, 142 P.2d 417, 420 (1943) as authority for this general rule. See also Cooley v.
Cooley, 220 Va. 749, 263 S.E.2d 49 (1980); Ryan v. Griffin, 199 Va. 891, 896, 103 S.E.2d 240,
244 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Cooley, 220 Va. at 749, 263 S.E.2d at 49; Capps, 216 Va. at 378, 219 S.E.2d at
901.
6. See, e.g., Arrington v. Arrington, 196 Va. 86, 95, 82 S.E.2d 548, 553 (1954); Cumming v.
Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 25, 102 S.E. 572, 575 (1920).
7. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-155 and -149 (Cum. Supp. 1987). However, with premarital agree-
ments, and arguably with postmarital agreements, an oral agreement can be taken out of the
Statute of Frauds under detrimental reliance and estoppel doctrines. See, e.g., T v. T, 216
Va. 867, 224 S.E.2d 148 (1976) (oral premarital child support promise upheld as valid).
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-155, -151(A)(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
9. Id. §§ 20-155, -151(B) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
11. Id. § 20-109.1.
12. Id. § 20-109.
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written contract must have been filed "with the pleadings or depo-
sitions. ' 13 Likewise, amended section 20-109.1 now provides that
the court may "affirm, ratify and incorporate by reference" in its
annulment or divorce decree "or by a separate decree prior to or
subsequent to such decree, any valid agreement between the par-
ties . . . ."' Both statutes in their amended form also expressly
provide that if the spouse receiving support dies or remarries,
spousal support shall terminate unless the parties have otherwise
provided through stipulation or contract. 15 The former statutes re-
quired the court, upon the payee's remarriage or death, to order
the cessation of spousal support absent any agreement to the con-
trary.1 6 The amended statutes, however, now appear to make ces-
sation of spousal support automatic upon the death or remarriage
of the payee. 17
2. Interest on Spousal and Child Support Arrearages
Interest on spousal and child support arrearages under section
20-78.2 of the Virginia Code' s has been reenacted so the support
order "shall also include an amount for interest on the arrearage at
the judgment interest rate if the person to whom such arrearage is
payable requests that interest be charged."' 9 However, the burden
is on the person to whom such arrearage is payable to compute all
interest due at the judgment interest rate established by section
6.1-330.102o and to furnish this information to the court.2
3. Spousal and Child Support Enforcement Statutes
There have been important amendments to the Virginia spousal
and child support enforcement statutes.22 The primary purpose of
these new amendments is to create more efficient spousal and child
13. Id. § 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
14. Id. § 20-109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
15. Id. §§ 20-109, -109.1.
16. Id. §§ 20-109, -109.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
17. Legal counsel, of course, must promptly notify the appropriate court when the payee
remarries or dies.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-78.2 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 6.1-330.10 (Repl. Vol. 1983) (repealed 1987); see id. § 6.1-330.54 (Cum. Supp.
1987).
21. Id. § 20-78.2 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
22. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-60.3, 20-60.5, 20-78.1, 20-79.1, 20-107.2, 20-88.29:1;
§§ 63.1-249, -250.1:1, -250.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987 & Rep. Vol. 1987).
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support enforcement procedures and to re-establish a localized sys-
tem for collection and disbursement of such support.2" For exam-
ple, various statutory amendments now provide that the Virginia
Department of Social Services may contract with a public or pri-
vate entity for the processing of support payments,24 and thus
hopefully resolve many of the collection and disbursement
problems previously experienced with a centralized administration.
Although an order directing a person to pay child or spousal sup-
port may be enforced through a payroll deduction from that per-
son's employer,25 an employer of 10,000 persons or more cannot be
required to make payments other than by a single combined pay-
ment to the Department of Social Services' central office in Rich-
mond unless the employer consents in writing to another plan.26
Finally, section 20-60.527 now provides that, in addition to
23. As stated in VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-249 (Repl. Vol. 1987):
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the efficient and accurate collection,
accounting and receipt of support for financially dependent children and their custo-
dians, and to further the effective and timely enforcement of such support. The cen-
tralization of these functions being largely accomplished by Chapter 488 of the Acts
of Assembly, 1985, and thereby resulting in consequences inconsistent with such pur-
poses, it is the further purpose of this chapter to correct the inefficiencies of such
centralization by reestablishing a localized system of collection and disbursement of
such support, with appropriate local accounting, while maintaining centralized ac-
counting, enforcement and other functions in the Department of Social Services as
are appropriate or necessary to comply with applicable federal law, recognizing that
reestablishment of such localized system requires careful planning and flexibility in
its implementation.
To that end the Department shall, as soon as practicable, proceed with the neces-
sary planning and implementation to establish at least in each judicial district a loca-
tion at which such support may be paid by obligors and from which payees may re-
ceive such payments, unless the payments are in cases in which public assistance is
being paid. Such implementation shall be accomplished by July 1, 1988, unless such
date be extended by mutual agreement of the Department, the Secretary of Human
Resources and the Committee on District Courts. The Department shall have the
authority to establish such additional locations within judicial districts as its re-
sources may permit. In the implementation hereof the Department shall have author-
ity to enter into contracts with clerks of juvenile and domestic relations district
courts with the approval of the Committee on District Courts, the Department of
Corrections, local departments of social services and any other appropriate public or
private entities to enforce, collect, account for and disburse payments for child or
spousal support . ...
Id.
24. Id. § 20-60.5(D) (Cum. Supp. 1987); see, e.g., id. § 20-79.11(c)(2)(m) (Cum. Supp.
1987); id. § 63.1-250.3(xiv) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
25. See, e.g., id. § 20-79.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
26. See, e.g., id. §§ 20-60.5(E); 20-79.1(C)(2A), (3); 20-88.29:1 (Cum. Supp. 1987); id.
8 63.1-250.3(xiv) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
27. Id. § 20-60.5 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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promptly paying the payee all support payments collected by it,
the Department of Social Services must pay interest to the payee
whenever the interest amount on a support payment exceeds five
dollars as provided in section 63.1-250.1:1.28
C. Procedural Matters
1. Marriage Requirements
Certain health information must be furnished to the applicants
for a Virginia marriage license under section 20-14.2,29 including
birth control information, genetic disorders information, and a list
of family planning clinics.3 0 A 1987 amendment to this statute fur-
ther required information on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
[AIDS] and the available tests to determine the presence or ab-
sence of the disease.3 1
Section 20-2532 authorizes certain persons, other than ministers,
to perform the marriage rites. A recent amendment to this statute
provides that:
any judge or justice of a court of record, any judge of a district court
of this Commonwealth or any retired judge or justice may celebrate
the rites of marriage either within or without the county or city
28. Id. The Code states:
The Department shall pay interest to the payee as provided in this section on cer-
tain spousal or child support payments it collects which have been ordered by a court
or established by administrative order to be paid to or through the Department to the
payee and for which the Department has an assignment of rights or has been given an
authorization to seek or enforce a support obligation as those terms are defined in
§ 63.1-250. Such interest shall accrue, at the legal rate as established by § 6.1-330.9,
on all support payments collected by the Department and paid to the payee more
than thirty days following the end of the month in which the payment was received
by the Department in nonpublic assistance cases. Interest shall be charged to the
Department on such payments if the Department has an established case and if the
obligor or payor provides identifying information including the Department case
number or the responsible person's name and correct social security number.
Id. § 63.1-250.1:1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-14.2 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
30. Id.
31. Id. Unfortunately, in a number of surveys I have taken over the past ten years with
married law students in my Domestic Relations course, it appears that many clerks of court
have not been furnishing applicants for marriage licenses in Virginia with this required
health information under § 20-14.2. In light of the present AIDS epidemic, and other medi-
cal and social developments, this statutory requirement should, indeed, be met.
32. Id. § 20-25 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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wherein his court is situated without the necessity of bond or order
of authorization. 33
2. Divorce Jurisdiction, Venue, and Forum Non Conveniens
Under section 20-96 of the Virginia Code, the chancery side of
the circuit court has jurisdiction in all suits for divorce and for
annulling or affirming marriages. 4 Venue for the suit lies in the
county or city where the parties last cohabited as husband and
wife, or at the option of the plaintiff, where the defendant re-
sides.35 If the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, or the de-
fendant is an out-of-state resident, venue lies where the plaintiff
resides.3" The 1987 statutory amendment added a forum non con-
veniens provision to this statute: "The court where such action is
commenced may, upon motion of any party or on its own motion,
and for good cause shown, transfer the action to any forum within
the Commonwealth in which such action could have been
brought.""7
3. How a Defendant May Accept Service of Process
A defendant under section 20-99.13s may now accept service of
process for divorce, annulment, or affirming a marriage by signing
the proof of service before any officer authorized to administer
oaths. In addition, service of process may be accepted or waived by
either party upon voluntary execution of a notarized writing or by
a defendant by filing an answer by counsel in the suit. 9 A nota-
rized writing may be provided in the clerk's office of any circuit
court or may be drafted and filed by counsel for either party to the
proceeding.40 Such effect and authorization also applies when a de-
fendant has filed an answer by counsel in the suit.41 The basic
33. Id. (emphasis added). The statute also authorizes the circuit courts to appoint one or
more residents of the city or county under bond to celebrate the rites of marriage.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96(A) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
35. Id. § 20-96(B).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 20-96(C).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-99.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Some of the repetitious language within this statute may be explained by the fact
that the various amendments to § 20-99.1 were based on two separate bills. See Va. H.B.
1324, 1987 Session; Va. H.B. 1325, 1987 Va. Acts Ch. 589.
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thrust of these amendments is that the defendant may now accept
service of process by filing a pleading.
4. Merger of a Bed and Board Divorce into an Absolute Divorce
In the past under section 20-121,42 a bed and board divorce4"
could be merged into an absolute divorce44 only after a one-year
period of living separate and apart without cohabitation or inter-
ruption. The 1987 amendment to that statute now provides for
such a merger after a six-month period if the parties have entered
into a separation agreement and have no minor children.45
D. Related Criminal Statutes
1. Parental Child Abduction
Parental abduction is a crime under the newly enacted section
18.2-49.1.46 Section 18.2-49.1 provides that any person who know-
ingly, wrongfully and intentionally withholds a child from the
child's custodial parent in a clear and significant violation of a
court order respecting the custody or visitation of such child is
guilty of parental abduction punishable as a Class 6 felony.47 This
section, however, appears to be applicable only if the child is with-
held in another state.48
2. Criminal Trespass
The 1987 General Assembly also amended section 18.2-119"s of
the Virginia Code covering trespass. The law now provides that:
[I]f any person, whether he is the owner, tenant or otherwise enti-
tled to the use of such land, building or premises, goes upon, or re-
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-121 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
43. A divorce a mensa et thoro, or a bed and board divorce, may be obtained under id.
§ 20-95 (Repl. Vol. 1983) for cruelty, reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, willful deser-
tion or abandonment. The parties in a bed and board divorce, as opposed to an absolute
divorce, may not remarry.
44. See id. § 20-91(6) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
45. Id. § 20-121.
46. VA. CODE: ANN. § 18.2-49.1 (Cure. Supp. 1987), see also Shepherd, supra note *, at 793.
47. VA. CODE ANN, § 18.2-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987). A "class six" felony provides for impris-
onment of not less than one year nor more than five years; or confinement in jail for not
more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $1,000; or both. See id. § 18.2-10
(Repl. Vol. 1982).
48. Id.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-119 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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mains upon such land, building or premises after having been pro-
hibited from doing so by a court of competent jurisdiction by an
order issued pursuant to §§ 16.1-253, 16.1-253.1, 16.1-279, 16.1-
279.1,. . . and after having been served with such order, he shall be
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.50
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Marriage
1. Nonaffirmation of a Bigamous Marriage
In Hager v. Hager,51 a husband and wife took part in a South
Carolina marriage ceremony in 1958, but the husband did not se-
cure a final divorce decree from his first wife until 1959 in Al-
bemarle County, Virginia. The second "wife" brought an action to
affirm this questionable marriage under section 20-90.12 The circuit
court found the South Carolina marriage to be valid, but the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and held that such a
marriage was bigamous.5
Citing section 20-435" with approval, the court held that "[a]ll
marriages which are prohibited by law on account of either of the
parties having a former wife or husband then living shall be abso-
lutely void."5 Therefore, the South Carolina marriage ceremony
"conferred no legal rights, and it was as if no marriage had ever
been performed."5 "
The Hager case was decided differently from the well-known
case of Spellens v. Spellens5 In Spellens, the wife married her
husband in Mexico before a California divorce from her first hus-
band became final. The California Supreme Court held that al-
50. Id.; see also id. § 16.1-253 (preliminary protective orders); id. § 16.1-253.1 (prelimi-
nary protective orders in cases of spouse abuse); id. § 16.1-279 (involuntary parental termi-
nation for abused, neglected or abandoned children); id. § 16.1-279.1 (protection orders in
cases of spouse abuse). A "class one" misdemeanor provides for confinement in jail for not
more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $1,000, either or both. Id. § 18.2-11(a)
(Repl. Vol. 1982).
51. 3 Va. App. 415, 349 S.E.2d 908 (1986).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-90 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
53. Hager, 3 Va. App. at 417, 349 S.E.2d at 909.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-43 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
55. Hager, 3 Va. App. at 416, 349 S.E.2d at 909 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-43 (Repl. Vol.
1983)).
56. Id. at 417, 349 S.E.2d at 909 (quoting Chitwood v. Prudential, 206 Va. 314, 317, 143
S.E.2d 915, 918 (1965)).
57. 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
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though this was indeed a bigamous marriage under California
law,58 nevertheless the husband and wife by their conduct were
both estopped to deny the marriage's validity.5 9 Although the Ha-
ger decision did not squarely address this estoppel issue, it may
still be used to argue by analogy that even if husband and wife are
estopped to deny the validity of their marriage, the State is not
estopped to question their bigamous relationship."0
2. Presumptive Ownership of a Marital Joint Bank Account
The case of Lewis v. House6 presented the novel question of to
what extent a marital joint bank account is subject to garnishment
by a creditor of the husband. In construing section 6.1-125.362 of
the Virginia Code, the Virginia Supreme Court held that because a
joint account belongs to the spouses "equally" does not mean that
the entire account is owned by each. 3 The Presumption therefore
arises that husband and wife each owned one-half of the funds of
their joint bank account. 4 Thus, unless the creditor could show by
clear and convincing evidence that the debtor husband owned
more than one-half of the funds, the creditor could garnish no
more than one-half of the joint bank account, less the debtor hus-
band's homestead exemption entitlement.6 5
B. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property on Divorce
1. Method of Distribution
The Virginia Court of Appeals has frequently recognized that a
trial court's task in making an equitable distribution award upon
divorce is formidable.6 Nevertheless, the court has recently em-
phasized and re-emphasized the crucial point that when making
58. CAL. CIv. CODE § 61 (West 1967) (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4401 (West
1970)).
59. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d at -, 317 P.2d at 619.
60. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 112 comment b (1934); Long v. State,
44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949); State v. De Meo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1 (1955) (void migra-
tory divorces). But see A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 253 (1962); Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d
210, 317 P.2d 613.
61. 232 Va. 28, 348 S.E.2d 217 (1986).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
63. Lewis, 232 Va. at 31, 348 S.E.2d at 219.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Bentz v. Bentz, 2 Va. App. 486, 489, 345 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1986); Rexrode v.
Rexrode, 1 Va. App. 385, 394, 339 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1986).
19871
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any monetary award, the trial court must follow all the provisions
of section 20-107.3,67 governing equitable distribution of property
on divorce, or that award will be invalid. The trial court, in other
words, cannot be selective as to particular provisions under the
statute that the judge will or will not apply; the judge must apply
all the provisions of section 20-107.3. 6' Thus, the failure of the trial
court when making a monetary award to consider the equities of
each party in the marital real estate, would render that award
invalid. 9
Although Virginia has no presumption favoring a 50-50 equal di-
vision of marital property under its equitable distribution stat-
ute, ° a court may nevertheless make an equal division of the mari-
tal property if, based upon the factors of section 20-107.3(E),7' an
equal division is appropriate.
Finally, it has been held that the trial court may make an equi-
table distribution award only after it has identified and valued the
parties' marital assets, and thus the trial court's determination of
ownership and value of the marital property must go beyond mere
guesswork in order to support an equitable distribution award. 3
2. Commissioner's Reports and Chancellor's Trial Court Decree
In Virginia, a commissioner in chancery may recommend to the
chancellor that a certain equitable distribution award on divorce
be made, and generally a commissioner's report should be affirmed
by the chancellor unless the commissioner's findings are not sup-
ported by the evidence. 4 But when the chancellor disapproves the
commissioner's findings, the appellate court must review the evi-
dence and ascertain whether, upon a correct application of the law,
the evidence supports the findings of the commissioner or the con-
clusions of the trial court.75 However, when a court refers a case to
a commissioner in chancery, it does not delegate its judicial func-
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
68. See, e.g., Robinette v. Robinette, 4 Va. App. 123, 128-29, 354 S.E.2d 808, 810-11
(1987); Rexrode, 1 Va. App. at 394, 339 S.E.2d at 550.
69. Robinette, 4 Va. App. at 129-30, 354 S.E.2d at 811.
70. Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341 S.E.2d 829, 830-31 (1986).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
72. Bentz, 2 Va. App. at 490, 345 S.E.2d at 775.
73. Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987).
74. Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987); Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App.
508, 514, 347 S.E.2d 134, 137-38 (1986).
75. Price, 4 Va. at 228, 355 S.E.2d at 907.
754 [Vol. 21:745
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tions to the commissioner and it is not necessarily bound by the
commissioner's recommendations.76
3. Classification and Valuation of Marital Property
In making an equitable distribution monetary award determina-
tion, the courts are faced initially with the two-fold problem of
identifying both the proper date for classification of marital prop-
erty and the proper date for valuing the marital property. The two
dates are not necessarily the same since the factors involved in the
selection of one may not be involved in the selection of the other.77
In the case of Mitchell v. Mitchell," the husband argued that in
making a monetary award pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-
107.3, the trial court must value the marital property as of the fil-
ing date of the bill of complaint. The wife, however, contended
that the trial court was correct in valuing the property at the date
of the evidentiary hearing, which was held shortly before entry of
the final divorce decree.79 The Virginia Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged that there are a number of valuation dates available for con-
sideration: (1) the date of separation of the parties; (2) the date of
filing the bill of complaint; (3) the date of trial; and (4) the date of
the final divorce decree.8 0 The Court of Appeals held that since
section 20-107.3 does not fix a date for determining the value of all
real and personal property of the parties, the trial court must se-
lect a valuation date if the parties cannot agree on one.8' The
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court:
should determine the value of the parties' assets as of a date as near
as practicable to the date of trial; except that, the trial court in its
decree may value all or any part of the assets as of a date after the
separation of the parties if necessary to arrive at an award more
consistent with the factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.3. Using
76. Id.; Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 26-27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986).
77. Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 229, 355 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1987).
78. 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987).
79. Id. at 116, 355 S.E.2d at 20.
80. Id. at 117-18, 355 S.E.2d at 20-21. The court acknowledged that each valuation date
"has its advantages and disadvantages," citing L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 7.01-.04 (1983) and Annotation, Proper Date for Valuation of Property Being Dis-
tributed Pursuant to Divorce, 34 A.L.R.4th 63 (1984) as authority.
81. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21.
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this standard, we find no error in the trial court's decision to select
the date of the evidentiary hearing for the valuation of the parties'
assets.8 2
In Price v. Price,83 the commissioner classified as marital prop-
erty the husband's pension fund and certain other items of real
and personal property that were purchased by the husband after
the separation of the parties. But the appellate court held that
those items acquired after the parties' last separation should not
have been included as marital assets absent a showing by the wife
that marital assets were used to purchase them. Thus, the pre-
sumption that property is marital rather than separate property
ceases on the date of the de facto dissolution of the marital
partnership. 4
The Price case also discussed the value of a ring that was "cre-
ated" prior to the parties' separation by remounting stones from
two other rings: an engagement ring given to the wife prior to the
marriage and another ring given to the wife after marriage by the
husband. 5 Thus, when separate property (the engagement stone)
is combined or commingled with marital property (the marital
stone), as these two rings were, the separate property loses its
character as separate property and the "new" property thus cre-
ated is marital property through transmutation."
82. Id. The court added:
There may be occasions where a trial court should select a date after separation but
prior to the date of trial upon which to value all or part of the assets involved. If one
spouse dissipates assets or deliberately allows their value to decline following separa-
tion, or if the value of marital property increases due to the efforts of one of them,
values determined upon the date of trial may result in a monetary award which is not
fair and equitable as required by Code § 20-107.3.
Id. See also Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 232, 355 S.E.2d 905, 909-10 (1987), where the
court held that:
Use of the commissioner's hearing date for valuation of the marital property was
not error under the facts of this case. No specific date was designated by the legisla-
ture for valuation of marital property. The evidentiary hearing date or trial date may
be the most practical and suitable valuation date in most instances. We recognize,
however, that this date may not always be the most appropriate since both fortuitous
or intentional events can drastically affect values and equities between date of classi-
fication and valuation, and courts should have the discretion to adopt a different date
if the equities of the case demand it.
Id.
83. 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987).
84. Id. at 229, 355 S.E.2d at 909.
85. Id. at 234-36, 355 S.E.2d at 911-12.
86. Id. at 236, 355 S.E.2d at 911-12.
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4. Pension or Retirement Plans as Marital Property
It is clear that a pension fund or retirement plan is within the
definition of marital property since it is acquired during the mar-
riage, and is not separate property as defined by section 20-107.3.11
The statute specifically states that:
The court may direct payment of a percentage of pension, profit-
sharing or retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested, payable
in a lump sum or over a period of time and only as such benefits are
payable. No such payment shall exceed fifty percent of the cash ben-
efits actually received by the party against whom such award is
made .... 8
The practical effect of this statute is that the trial judge must
specify separately any part of a monetary award that is based upon
pension or retirement benefits, and make special provisions for its
payment in order to conform with these payment restrictions.8 9
Thus, in the case of McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,e" a lump sum
marital property award to the wife of 40% of the husband's vested
retirement pension was held to be equitable. But in the case of
Artis v. Artis, 1 a trial court order awarding only 15% of the hus-
band's military pension to the wife was set aside as not being sup-
ported by the record.
5. Personal Injury Awards as Marital Property
The traditional view in many jurisdictions is that since there is a
presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is
marital property, any claim for tortious personal injury by one
spouse should be equitably distributable upon divorce.2 Other
courts have held that such a cause of action cannot be divided at
87. Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 233, 355 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1987); see also Sawyer v.
Sawyer, 1 Va. App. 75, 79, 335 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1985).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
89. Price, 4 Va. App. at 233, 355 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App.
113, 121, 355 S.E.2d 18, 23 (1987)).
90. 2 Va. App. 463, 346 S.E.2d 535 (1986).
91. 4 Va. App. 132, 354 S.E.2d 812 (1987); see also Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 237,
349 S.E.2d 422 (1986) (judge abused his discretion in failing to consider all statutory criteria
in awarding wife one-quarter of husband's military retirement payments).
92. See, e.g., Gan v. Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 404 N.E.2d 306 (1980); In re Marriage of
Parsons, 28 Wash. App. 276, 622 P.2d 415 (1981); Mack v. Mack, 108 Wis. 2d 604, 323
N.W.2d 153 (1982).
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all.9 3 A middle ground "apportionment" rule has been adopted in
some states holding that although lost wages and medical pay-
ments made from marital funds should be considered as marital
property, the personal suffering and disability suffered by the in-
jured spouse as part of an inchoate personal injury claim is not a
property right subject to equitable distribution.9 4 This rule was ap-
parently adopted in the circuit court decision of Mabe v. Mabe . 5
6. Third Party Equitable Distribution Factors
In the case of Woolley v. Woolley,9 it was held that in making
an equitable distribution award, the court had no basis upon which
to grant the husband's mother, who was not a party to the divorce
action, a portion of the sale proceeds of the marital residence ab-
sent any elements for imposing a constructive trust. This result
was reached even though there was evidence that the husband's
mother had put $27,500 into the marital property."
Likewise, the court did not err in refusing to grant a monetary
award in Bentz v. Bentz,9e where the husband's mother provided
$10,000 for the down payment on the marital home, since this
money might have been intended for the parties jointly.99
93. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Lowrey, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976) (personal injury claim
is not property); Fries v. Fries, 288 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1980) (action is too speculative).
94. See, e.g., Amato v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210, 434 A.2d 639 (1981); see also Jurek v.
Jurek, 124 Ariz. 596, 606 P.2d 812 (1980).
95. 8 Va. Cir. 339 (Wise County 1987). The court cited Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210, 434
A.2d 639 with approval. But see L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6.25
(1983) ("States [including Virginia] which have a presumption of marital property are likely
to hold that all components of a personal injury claim received during the marriage are
marital property.").
The Mabe decision also held that worker's compensation awards constituted marital prop-
erty and marital property wrongfully converted into separate property would also be
deemed to be marital property. 8 Va. Cir. 339.
96. 3 Va. App. 237, 349 S.E.2d 422 (1986).
97. Id.
98. 2 Va. App. 486, 345 S.E.2d 773 (1986).
99. Id. at 489, 345 'S.E.2d at 775; see also Robinette v. Robinette, 4 Va. App. 123, 354
S.E.2d 808 (1987), (for purposes of determining marital property on divorce, grantor-spouse






As is true with equitable distribution awards under section 20-
107.3,100 failure by the trial judge to consider all the statutory fac-
tors of section 20-107.1101 in determining spousal support consti-
tutes reversible error.10 2 However, when the trial court did consider
all the factors of section 20-107.1, it was held not to be an abuse of
discretion to order the husband to make mortgage payments on
the marital home for the benefit of the wife and children in lieu of
ordering spousal support.103 Finally, the right to spousal support
will survive an absolute ex parte divorce proceeding in another
state, since the right to spousal support is a personal claim which
may not be denied without due process.104
2. Denial of Spousal Support: When Justified
In Collins v. Collins,105 the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed
the rule followed in three earlier opinions'01 stating that whenever
a divorce decree based upon living separate and apart'01 denies an
award of spousal support, whether expressly or by failure to ad-
dress the issue, the decree will be reversed and the cause remanded
unless the record on appeal reveals that the chancellor made a
finding, supported by credible evidence, that: (1) the appellant was
guilty of a marital fault ground; 08 or (2) in consideration of the
factors enumerated in section 20-107.1,109 the equities of the par-
ties weighed against an award of spousal support.
Thus, although fault in the breakup of a marriage is a factor that
the court must consider in making a spousal support, it would be
reversible error for the trial court, upon the request of either party,
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
101. Id. § 20-107.1.
102. See, e.g., Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 237, 349 S.E.2d 422 (1986).
103. Calamos v. Calamos, 4 Va. App. 96, 354 S.E.2d 102 (1987).
104. Hayes v. Hayes, 3 Va. App. 499, 502-03, 351 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1986) (citing with ap-
proval Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Newport v. Newport, 219 Va. 48, 45
S.E.2d 134 (1978)).
105. 233 Va. 245, 355 S.E.2d 332 (1987).
106. Thomasson v. Thomasson, 225 Va. 394, 302 S.E.2d 63 (1983); Bristow v. Bristow, 221
Va. 1, 267 S.E.2d 89 (1980); Brooker v. Brooker, 218 Va. 12, 235 S.E.2d 309 (1977).
107. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cure. Supp. 1987).
108. See id. §§ 20-91(1), (3), (6), -95.
109. Id. § 20-107.1.
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to fail to make a reservation in the divorce decree of the right to
receive future spousal support in the event of a change of
circumstances.' 0
Likewise, it was held that when a husband who was guilty of
desertion had an annual income in excess of $64,000 and a net
worth of between $167,000 and $189,000, and his wife had a weekly
income of $145.00 and no separate property of any significance, it
was an abuse of the chancellor's discretion to deny the wife any
spousal support."'
However, in a case of first impression in Virginia," 2 the Virginia
Court of Appeals held that pendente lite spousal support would be
terminated when a divorce action is dismissed, although laches
would not constitute a bar to the wife in collecting her support
arrearages." 3
D. Property Settlement Agreements
In at least four recent decisions," 4 the Virginia Court of Appeals
re-emphasized: (1) that property settlement agreements are con-
tracts, and therefore courts must apply the same rules of interpre-
tation applicable to contracts generally;" 5 and (2) that Virginia ad-
heres to the "plain meaning rule" that if an agreement is complete
on its face and plain and unambiguous in its terms, the court is not
at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself
because the writing is the repository of the final agreement of the
parties." 6 However, on review, the appellate court has an equal op-
portunity to consider the words of the contract, and thus is not
bound by the trial court's construction."17
i
110. Bacon v. Bacon, 3 Va. App. 484, 351 S.E.2d 37 (1986).
111. Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 514, 347 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1986).
112. Smith v. Smith, 4 Va. App. 148, 354 S.E.2d 816 (1987).
113. Id. at 151-52, 354 S.E.2d at 818.
114. See, e.g., Henderlite v. Henderlite, 3 Va. App. 539, 351 S.E.2d 913 (1987); Smith v.
Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 351 S.E.2d 593 (1986); Hederick v. Hederick, 3 Va. App. 452, 350
S.E.2d 526 (1986); Harris v. Woodrum, 3 Va. App. 428, 350 S.E.2d 667 (1986).
115. Harris, 3 Va. App. at 431, 350 S.E.2d at 669 (citing Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11,
15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985)); see also Hedrick, 3 Va. App. at 455, 350 S.E.2d at 528.
116. Harris, 3 Va. App. at 432, 350 S.E.2d at 669 (citing Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201,
208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983)).
117. Hederick, 3 Va. App. at 455, 350 S.E.2d at 528 (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va.
184, 187-88, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)).
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E. Divorce Grounds and Defenses
1. Adultery
In the case of Bentz v. Bentz,"" the husband sought a divorce
from a thirteen-year marriage on the grounds of desertion and cru-
elty. The husband requested equitable distribution of the marital
property, but neither party requested spousal support. The court
granted the parties a divorce on the ground of living separate and
apart in excess of one year." 9
When the husband later moved to amend his bill of complaint to
allege adultery, the trial court denied his motion and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The husband contended
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend his bill of
complaint to allege adultery because the amendment would have
strengthened his argument for a monetary award under section 20-
107.3(D).120 The Court of Appeals agreed that the right to file an
amended pleading rests in the sound discretion of the court and
shall be liberally granted in the furtherance of justice.1 21 But in
this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to amend since, under section 20-107.3(E)(5),122 in deter-
mining any equitable distribution award, the court must consider
the factors-including adultery-which contributed to the dissolu-
tion of the marriage.' 23
118. 2 Va. App. 486, 345 S.E.2d 773 (1986).
119. Id. at 487, 345 S.E.2d at 773.
120. Id. at 448, 345 S.E.2d at 774 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D) (Cum. Supp.
1987)).
121. Id. (citing with approval VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:8; Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Va. 736, 742, 292
S.E.2d 370, 373 (1982)).
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987). This section provides that the
court shall consider the factors which contributed to the marriage dissolution, including
adultery, conviction of a felony, or cruelty and desertion. Id.
123. Bentz, 2 Va. App. at 488, 345 S.E.2d at 774. It should also be noted that the clear
and convincing evidence test to prove adultery as enunciated in Dooley v. Dooley, 222 Va.
240, 278 S.E.2d 865 (1981), has been reaffirmed in Seeman v. Seeman, 233 Va. 290, 355
S.E.2d 884 (1987). In Seeman, the husband proved that the wife had spent a number of
nights in the same room with another adult male, but the wife testified she had not slept in
the same bed nor had sexual intercourse due to her strong religious beliefs. The court held
that adultery had not been proved by clear and convincing evidence. But see Coe v. Coe,
225 Va. 616, 303 S.E.2d 923 (1983) (adultery proved when wife stayed at paramour's house).
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2. Desertion
The Virginia Supreme Court, in the case of Sprott v. Sprott,
12 4
summarized the divorce grounds for proving desertion in Virginia
and overturned the trial court by concluding that "[a] gradual
breakdown in the marital relationship" did not constitute grounds
for proving desertion. 2 5 The court held that:
For many years, this Court adhered rigidly to the rule that "one
spouse is not justified in leaving the other, unless the conduct of the
other is sufficient to establish the foundation of judicial proceeding
for a divorce." The rule has been relaxed in more recent decisions.
But we have never held, and we decline here to hold, that one
spouse is legally justified in leaving the other merely because there
has been a gradual breakdown in the marital relationship.'26
Thus the wife in Sprott was found guilty of desertion and was not
entitled to spousal support.'27
In addition, another recent supreme court decision has empha-
sized that a spouse is not guilty of legal desertion in separating
from the other spouse while a divorce suit is pending between
them if the suit is not frivolous and was not instituted as a sham to
shield the complainant from a charge of desertion. 28
In the case of Jamison v. Jamison,12 9 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that although a showing of mere cessation of sexual in-
tercourse would be insufficient to establish cruelty or desertion as
grounds for divorce, 30 nevertheless:
124. 233 Va. 238, 355 S.E.2d 881 (1987).
125. Id. at 242, 355 S.E.2d at 883.
126. Id. at 241-42, 355 S.E.2d at 882-83 (citations omitted); cf. Rowand- v. Rowand, 215
Va. 344, 346, 210 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1974) (wife who left at husband's order was free from
legal fault); Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 382, 385, 219 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1975) (wife who left
husband because of one single act of physical abuse was free from legal fault); Breschel v.
Breschel, 221 Va. 208, 212, 269 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1980) (wife who left husband when she
reasonably believed continued cohabitation endangered her health); McLaughlin v. Mc-
Laughlin, 2 Va. App. 463, 346 S.E.2d 535 (1986) (only proven misconduct of an offending
spouse that is so serious that it makes the relationship intolerable or unendurable will jus-
tify the other spouse's departure; and if wife cannot prove husband's alleged cruelty, she is
guilty of desertion).
127. Sprott, 233 Va. at 244, 355 S.E.2d at 883.
128. Byrd v. Byrd, 232 Va. 115, 348 S.E.2d 262 (1986).
129. 3 Va. App. 644, 352 S.E.2d 719 (1987).
130. Id. at 649, 352 S.E.2d at 722 (citing Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 222 Va. 53, 278 S.E.2d
813 (1981); Aichner v. Aichner, 215 Va. 624, 212 S.E.2d 278 (1975)).
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[T]he willful withdrawal of the privilege of sexual intercourse, with-
out just cause or excuse, constitutes willful desertion, within the
meaning of such statute on the subject as that in Virginia, when
such withdrawal is accompanied, as in the cause before us, with such
willful breach and neglect of other marital duties as to practically
destroy home life in every true sense, and to render the marriage
state well nigh intolerable and impossible to be endured. Such con-
duct, on the part either of husband or wife, is considered to be a
general withdrawal from the duties of the marital relationship and,
if willfuly done, without just cause or excuse, this, by the great
weight of authority, constitutes willful desertion.131
Finally, in the case of Petachenko v. Petachenko,132 the Virginia
Supreme Court held that a single act of sexual intercourse, without
any intent to reconcile, did not constitute a resumption of marital
cohabitation, nor did it constitute an intent to end the desertion.133
The court also held that: (1) once separation and the intent to de-
sert have been established, desertion is presumed to be continued
until the contrary is shown; and (2) the jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate a divorce proceeding is not destroyed by the conduct of
the parties that might require dismissal of the bill or cross-bill of
complaint.1 3 4
3. Living Separate and Apart
The circuit court case of Doggett v. Doggett 35 addressed the is-
sue of whether a husband and wife living under the same roof can
be considered to be living "separate and apart" without cohabita-
tion or interruption pursuant to Code section 20-91(9) (a).1 36 In
Doggett, Judge Hughes granted a divorce, finding that the husband
and wife had lived "separate and apart" even though they were
living under the same roof, because they did not sleep in the same
room nor did they "spend any time together as husband and
wife. '13 7 The court recognized that neither party had moved out,
131. Jamison, 3 Va. App. at 647-48, 352 S.E.2d at 721 (emphasis added) (quoting Chan-
dler v. Chandler, 132 Va. 418, 430-31, 112 S.E. 856, 860-61 (1922)).
132. 232 Va. 296, 350 S.E.2d 600 (1986).
133. Id. at 301, 350 S.E.2d at 602-03. This case overruled in part the earlier decision of
Anderson v. Anderson, 196 Va. 26, 82 S.E.2d 562 (1954).
134. Petachenko, 232 Va. at 301, 350 S.E.2d at 603.
135. 5 Va. Cir. 349 (Richmond 1986); see also Swisher, Domestic Relations: Annual Sur-
vey of Virginia Law, 20 U. RICm. L. REV. 811, 823 (1986).
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
137. 5 Va. Cir. at 349-50.
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however, because of financial hardship.1 38 But in the circuit court
case of Yane v. Yane, 3 9 Judge Kulp disagreed with the Doggett
rationale and held that husband and wife could not live "separate
and apart" while under the same roof, stating:
[T]he Legislature did not intend that a divorce could be granted
on the ground of 'separate and apart' when the parties live together
in the same house. [T]he Supreme Court has interpreted the word
'cohabit,' as it appears in the divorce venue statute, to mean 'having
dwelled together under the same roof with more or less
permanency.'
The general rule of statutory construction is that words used in
the same act or statute should be given the same meaning unless the
contrary should be made clear by other qualifying or explanatory
terms. In my opinion the word 'cohabitation' in § 20-91(9)(a) should
be given the same meaning as the word 'cohabited' as used in § 20-
96. These terms are both used in Chapter 6 of Title 20, and both are
concerned with [divorce] . 1.. 40
Finding no authority to the contrary, the court defined "cohabi-
tation" as used in section 20-91(9)(a), as "[dwelling] together
under the same roof with more or less permanency."' The court
distinguished cohabitation from desertion, which can occur even
when the parties live under the same roof. "It seems . . . to be a
contradiction in terms to say parties are living separate and apart
but are dwelling together under the same roof . ... ",4
Hopefully, an appellate decision will soon clarify these divergent
circuit court opinions.
138. Id.
139. 8 Va. Cir. 336 (Henrico County 1987).
140. Id. at 336 (citing with approval Netzer v. Reynolds, 231 Va. 444, 345 S.E.2d 291
(1986); Colley v. Colley, 204 Va. 225, 228, 129 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1963); McDaniel v. Common-
wealth, 199 Va. 287, 99 S.E.2d 623 (1957)).
141. Id. at 337.
142. Id. The court distinguished Chandler v. Chandler, 132 Va. 418, 112 S.E. 856 (1922)
relied on by Judge Hughes in Doggett. Chandler involved a divorce on the grounds of deser-
tion and never considered the meaning of "cohabitation."
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F. Statute of Limitations Applied to Foreign Jurisdiction Di-
vorce Decrees
In the case of Carter v. Carter,143 the Virginia Supreme Court, in
a 4-3 decision, held that Virginia's ten-year statute of limitations,
as applied to the enforcement of a Florida divorce judgment, was
neither stringent nor unreasonable, nor did it offend the federal
full faith and credit clause.144 Moreover, even if the classification of
foreign judgment creditors was subject to an equal protection chal-
lenge,1" there was no suspect classification or fundamental right
involved, and the disparate treatment of foreign judgment credi-
tors was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 46
G. Smoot v. Smoot: A Seminal Decision
The Virginia Supreme Court recently decided the seminal case
of Smoot v. Smoot 47 which discusses three concepts of major im-
portance to the Virginia family law practitioner: (1) the "inception
of title" doctrine versus the "source of the funds" doctrine as ap-
plied to equitable distribution of property; (2) the "transmutation"
doctrine of separate property becoming marital property when it is
commingled with marital property; and (3) the role of fault in de-
termining equitable distribution of property upon divorce.
1. "Inception of Title" Doctrine versus "Source of the Funds"
Doctrine
Ronald and Bernice Smoot, prior to their marriage, took title to
a tract of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. 148 In
1977, two years after their marriage, they commenced construction
of a new home on this tract of land. Funding was obtained from
two sources: a $25,000 construction loan secured by a deed of trust
143. 232 Va. 166, 349 S.E.2d 95 (1986) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-252 (Repl. Vol.
1984)).
144. Carter, 232 Va. 166, 349 S.E.2d 95 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-252 (Repl. Vol.
1984) and U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1).
145. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
146. Carter, 232 Va. at 173-74, 349 S.E.2d at 98-99. There was, however, a dissenting
opinion by Justice Russell, joined by Justices Poff and Thomas, stating: "In my view, this
case is controlled by Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966). The majority opinion labors
diligently to distinguish that case, but it labors in vain ... ." Carter, 232 Va. at 174-76, 349
S.E.2d at 100.
147. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
148. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 437, 357 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1987).
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:745
on the property; and $20,000 in cash contributed by the husband
from a personal injury settlement he received two years before the
marriage. During the four-year construction period between 1977
and 1981, the wife's salary was primarily used to pay the parties'
basic living expenses, while the husband's earnings were primarily
used for construction expenses. 149
In 1983, when the husband filed a bill of complaint seeking a no-
fault divorce from his wife, he asked the trial court to award him
the $20,000 from his personal injury award as his "separate prop-
erty. ' 150 The trial court, citing the case of Harper v. Harper151 as
persuasive authority, held that the husband was entitled to "a
credit ... of $20,000 for funds contributed by him," arguably
under a "source of the funds" doctrine.152
On appeal, the wife argued that by awarding the husband the
$20,000 monetary award, the chancellor, in effect, had classified
the marital home as "part marital and part separate" under the
"source of the funds" doctrine, when such a classification should
not be permitted under Virginia's equitable distribution statute.15 3
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the wife, and rejected a
"source of the funds" doctrine in Virginia.15 1
149. Id. at 437, 357 S.E.2d at 729.
150. Id. For a discussion of the Smoot v. Smoot trial court decision, see Swisher & Bucur,
supra note 2, at 749-51.
151. 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982).
152. 233 Va. 437, 438, 357 S.E.2d 728, 729. Under a "source of the funds" theory:
when property is acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital and marital prop-
erty, the property is characterized as part nonmarital and part marital. Thus, a
spouse contributing nonmarital property is entitled to an interest in the property in
the ratio of the nonmarital investment to the total nonmarital and marital invest-
ment in the property. The remaining property is characterized as marital property
and its value is subject to equitable distribution.
Harper, 294 Md. at 80, 448 A.2d at 929.
However, this "source of the funds" rule runs counter to an "inception of title" doctrine,
adopted by other courts, which states that property on divorce can be either marital or
separate, but not both. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963); In re
Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866
(Mo. App. 1976). But even under the "inception of title" doctrine, the other spouse who
contributed payment to the original property could have a right to reimbursement or an
equitable lien in the property. See generally Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916, for a good
discussion of both doctrines.
153. Smoot, 233 Va. at 439, 357 S.E.2d at 730. The equitable distribution statute is VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3A(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
154. "Unlike the Maryland statute as construed by the Harper court, Code § 20-107.3
contemplates only two kinds of property-marital property and separate property, each ex-
pressly defined. Our statute does not recognize a hybrid species of property. ... Smoot,
233 Va. at 441, 357 S.E.2d at 731.
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2. "Transmutation" of Separate Property into Marital Property
Even though the Virginia Supreme Court in Smoot v. Smoot re-
jected the "source of the funds" theory that property can be "part
marital and part separate," the court nevertheless affirmed the
doctrine of transmutation holding that when "a spouse fails to seg-
regate and instead, commingles separate property with marital
property, the chancellor must classify the commingled property as
marital property subject to equitable distribution.' 1 55
3. The Role of Fault in Determining Equitable Property Distri-
bution on Divorce
Finally, the wife in Smoot v. Smoot argued that the chancellor's
monetary award to the husband failed to balance the equities of
the parties because the chancellor "ignored" the husband's fault
ground in divorce under the applicable statute."5 6 But the Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's award, holding that the
chancellor did in fact consider each of the enumerated factors, 15 7
and "although the [husband] has been found at fault, the total re-
lationship between the parties does not dictate that a division [of
property] different than as set forth should be made. ' 15' Thus,
since the record showed that the chancellor did not abuse his dis-
cretion, nor misapply any statutory mandates, the equitable distri-
bution award was not reversed on appeal. 159
However, the court rejected the wife's further contention that the chancellor's order
granting a monetary award to the husband was based on an application of the source of the
funds doctrine. As the chancellor had noted, "the marital home is marital property, [and]
* . . both parties are deemed to have rights and interests in [the] marital property ......
Id. at 442, 357 S.E.2d at 731.
155. Id. at 441, 357 S.E.2d at 731 (emphasis added) (citing with approval In re Marriage
of Smith, 86 11. 2d 518, 531-32, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1245-46 (1981) (applying the doctrine of
"transmutation" of separate property into marital property)); see Price v. Price, 4 Va. App.
228, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
The Smoot court, however, did not discuss the concept of "tracing" separate property
from marital property. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. App. 1979); Turley v.
Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. App. 1978).
156. 233 Va. 435, 442, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987) (applying VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-107.3(E)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987)).
157. Id. at 443, 357 S.E.2d at 732. It is mandatory to consider all factors enumerated in
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(1)-(11) (Cum. Supp. 1987). See, e.g., Rexrode v. Rexrode, 1 Va.
App. 385, 394-95, 339 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1986).
158. Smoot, 233 Va. at 443, 357 S.E.2d at 732.
159. Id. at 443, 357 S.E.2d at 732.
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